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Abstract
This work deals with design and implementation of the system for document management
and versioning. The first part contains description of related work. In the second part,
information security concepts and security model, upon which application is build, is dis-
cussed. Third part contains description of designed system and its typical use in a form of
sequence diagram. Fourth part introduces cryptographic protocol used in this work. Next
follows the description of implementation and security analysis of developed system. The
output of this work is cryptographic protocol for document management and versioning,
and client-server application implementing this protocol.
Abstrakt
Tato práce se zabývá návrhem a implementací systému pro spravování a verzování elek-
tronických dokumentů. V první části jsou popsány aplikace se stejným nebo podobným
zaměřením. Druhá část obsahuje popis bezpečnosti informace a představuje bezpečnos-
tní model nad kterým je aplikace vybudována. Třetí část popisuje navržený systém a
jeho typické použití formou sekvenčního diagramu. Ve čtvrté části je představen kryp-
tografický protokol použitý v této práci, postavený na kryptografii veřejných klíčů. Dále
následuje popis implementace a analýza bezpečnosti navrženého systému. Výstupem práce
je kryptografický protokol pro správu a verzování dokumentů a aplikace typu klient-server
implementující tento protokol.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In almost every working industry people need to communicate with each other, share their
knowledge, collaborate on projects or exchange information regardless of they are located in
the same office or at opposite sides of the world. In many cases it is done over the internet
and this form of the communication is growing continuously. E-mail, VoIP services, instant
messaging or social networks are some of most popular ways. For more specific usage
like multimedia sharing, software development or exchange of an arbitrary data, powerful
specialized systems has been developed. Some of them are utilized for collaboration on
contract documents where security plays a crucial role. The typical example of this group
are legal documents.
Many online solutions are currently available and in use (not only) for collaboration on
legally binding documents1. However, many of them do not meet security requirements
necessary for documents of such importance. Some of them do not provide digital sig-
nature functionality or two-factor authentication, lack effective file and user permission
management, document versioning, history tracking or quick document comparison. An-
other common way for collaboration on legal documents is sending their printed copies to
other parties of contract by mail or personal delivery, both of which can be rather slow
and expensive. As a result, sensitive documents are usually either vulnerable to informa-
tion disclosure by unprivileged person or their management is chaotic or they consume too
many resources (manpower as well as time and money).
The goal of this thesis is to design the cryptographic protocol for secure document
exchange and signing as well as development of the application implementing required
functionality. The application will contain simple but feature-rich interface, containing
support for document management, versioning and signing. The system could find its
application in law firms, real estate agencies or in other companies where circumstances
require an agreement of many parties on single document or set of documents.
The text of this work is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of related
projects. Chapter 3 discusses general security concepts. In Chapter 4, core features of the
application are described in detail with use case provided. Chapter 5 provides overview of
the public key cryptography which is crucial to proposed cryptographic protocol, proposes
a scheme of public key infrastructure, and describes protocol more formally. Chapters 6
and 7 discuss details of implementation and analyze system’s security. Chapter 8 discuss
possible extensions and improvements, and finally Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.
1Legally binding document is, according to http://thelawdictionary.org, a lawful action (e.g. an
agreement) consciously agreed by two or more entities, establishing lawful accountability.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In recent years, many systems providing content management, document versioning, col-
laboration and signing have emerged. Although, there is no official categorization of these
systems, for the purpose of this work, we divide them by type of content they manage into:
textual vs. binary data, documents, multimedia files, etc.; by targeted users: from personal
use through small businesses to big corporations, and by type of storage they provide to
centralized (cloud/remote server) or local storage. Based on a functionality they provide,
we can further divide them into four categories: systems for legal content management; Ver-
sion Control Systems (VCS); general cloud solutions; and document signing and managing
systems. Selected software from each category is reviewed with regards to a functionality
of a system being developed.
For quick review, Table 2 summarizes some of most important features of described
application, in regard to designed application.
2.1 Systems for Secure Document Sharing and Management
This category contains systems designed specifically for legal content management – Closing
Table and Effacts – and general purpose systems applicable also in other areas – Fluix,
WatchDox, ExperDocs and DocuXplorer.
Closing Table
Closing Table [27] is commercial, document and transaction management system pri-
marily used for document sharing, negotiation and archiving. Closing Table is aimed
at lawyers/attorneys, brokers and other real estate and business firms. It supports orga-
nization of documents into deals containing list of authorized users for current deal (no
per-document access granting is possible) and list of documents with further categorization
(i.e. leases, loans, closing documents), document storing, versioning and archiving. Users
are able to upload new documents into deal, update existing documents (by uploading new
versions), sign documents using digital signatures, comment on documents and their re-
visions and review history of particular document. Personal web page is generated upon
user’s registration for easy linking person to his account.
Website does not provide explicit information on underlying technologies used, nor on
features as two factor authentication, comparing different versions of same document, PDF
generation, searching on documents or email/sms notifications and since no trial version is
available, there’s no way to verify their presence.
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Closing Table 3 3 ? 3 ? ?
Fluix 3 ? 3 3 ? 7
WatchDox ? ? 3 3 ? 3
Effacts 31 ? 3 ? ? ?
DocuXplorer ? 3 ? 3 ? ?
ExperDocs 7 7 7 7 7 7
DocuSign 3 7 3 7 7 7
E-Sign 3 7 3 7 ? ?
DocVerify 3 ? 3 ? ? 3
Open eSignForms 32 3 7 3 7 7
Git 3 3 3 3 3 7
Subversion 7 3 7 3 3 7
Google Docs 7 3 3 3 3 7
Office365 3 3 3 3 3 7
Table 2.1: Summary of core features support in described applications.
1 In form of integration with DocuSign only.
2 Only one key-pair per deployment.
Fluix
Fluix [14] is cloud based, collaborative document management software with focus on
portable devices like tablets and smartphones. It is designed for construction industry, but
examples of its use cases extend far beyond it. Fluix provides functionality for a document
storing and sharing, collecting signatures for them, automating workflow, viewing document
of (almost) any type, templates of documents, putting annotations, tracking changes and
even modifying PDF files. Documents can be signed by digital signature as well as via
tablet or smartphone with pen or finger. When signing by hand, the software keeps also
information about dynamics of movement so in the case of need, a signature can be later
forensically inspected. The software also supports two factor authentication for signing into
the system by providing an user name with password together with unique pin code sent
to a mobile phone.
Fluix does not have support for document versioning and comparison, only one user at
time can be requested to sign a document and user interface is less intuitive in web version.
Software is closed source, therefore no closer technical details of underlying system and
protocol are available.
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WatchDox
WatchDox[4] is a data-centric security solution for a document sharing and synchronization
from BlackBerry. It supports basic password and multi-factor authentication as well as inte-
gration with MS Active Directory and other identity management systems. Each document
is encrypted with unique key using 256-bit AES encryption with possibility to use hardware
security module1. Access rights to a document can be set individually for a user, group,
or based on a role. User can annotate and edit documents, put watermarks, set expiration
or even wipe out a document from all locations (i.e. also after sharing with other users).
Activity of each document is tracked as well, providing information about who, when and
where accessed a document, and what action he made. Moreover, advanced digital rights
management can be applied to a document, restricting how documents are used, e.g. for-
warding, printing or downloading. For its public cloud services, WatchDox utilizes Amazon
Web Services (AWS) but provides also others, on-premise deployment options. WatchDox
makes its services available through a web browser or as a mobile application on all plat-
forms and allows integration with another cloud solutions, primarily MS SharePoint. It
is also compliant with HIPAA/HITECH2 healthcare security program, ITAR/EAR3 and
FedRAMP4 certified.
Website does not provide information about features as a document signing, versioning
or comparison.
Effacts
Effacts[12] is the plug-and-play legal management software for lean legal departments to
manage contracts, entities, claims, compliance and more. System provides tools for a doc-
ument management and collaboration with external parties. Every document is encrypted,
activity of users and documents are logged, custom system notifications are supported. As
extra tools are offered integration with DocuSign and advanced authentication methods
in form of Single Sign On (SSO)5 and two factor authentication. Specialized modules for
easing contract, claim, entity, compliance and meeting management are available as well.
Service runs by default in Effact’s private cloud but can also be deployed on a custom
server. All datacenters are SSAE 16 (SOC1)/ISAE 3402 Type II6 audited.
No information about document versioning, commenting, user management and access
control is available.
DocuXplorer
DocuXplorer [10] is another feature-rich system for document management accessible through
both web interface and as an standalone application. System supports tracking of docu-
ment versions, document indexing and searching (including binary files as PDF), OCR for
scanned documents, text extraction from PDF and is also highly integrated with MS Office
1Hardware security module is a hardware device for safe storing, processing and management of crypto-
graphic keys.
2http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/HITECH-act-enforcement-interim-final-rule/
index.html
3http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html
4http://www.fedramp.gov/
5Using SSO, user is able to gain access to connected, but different systems with single ID and password.
6http://ssae16.com
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suite. DocuXplorer support organization of documents into cabinets, drawers, folders and
index fields. User or group permissions can be set by administrator on any of these levels.
DocuXplorer does not provide any information about document commenting, signing
and two factor authentication.
ExperDocs
ExperDocs [2] is another tool for a document management and collaboration accessible
through both web interface and stand-alone desktop application. ExperDocs’ main features
are advanced file organization with tagging feature, sharing, publishing and collaboration
on documents, users’ permission control, commenting on arbitrary file, encryption on server
and workstation.
Software however miss many important features like document versioning, comparing
and signing and two factor authentication.
2.2 Document Signing and Management Systems
Since digital signatures are utilized in many areas, numerous systems for dealing with
electronic signatures in documents or other electronic content have been developed. Two
of the most popular solutions are described here – DocuSign and E-Sign – together with
DocVerify, and the only open source software described here, Open eSignForms.
DocuSign
Most widely used software in this category is DocuSign [9] allowing users to simply prepare
and sign their documents by pasting a signature – prepared hand-written like signature (i.e.
stamp) – onto specified place in a document and then digitally signing hash of a document
with user’s private key. Signature on single or multiple documents can be requested from an
arbitrary number of users who can either sign, postpone or decline with clarification. When
sending document for a signature, sender can additionally verify recipient’s identity by
asking for the secret code they communicate with each other, without use of the application.
For example, by entering a secret code received in SMS, by requesting recipient to answer
the call and providing a secret code or to answer questions about themselves based on data
available in public records.
No document versioning is available as well as no document comparison. Commenting
is available in a form of email. DocuSign is, among others, ISO 27001 [16] certified and
xDTM [59] compliant. As DocuSign is also closed software, no detail technical specification
is available.
E-Sign
The goal of E-Sign [11] is to provide easy to use and intuitive service for collecting signatures
on an arbitrary electronic document or any other type of a file. During registration, an
identity is verified via e-mail. After successful registration, user is immediately able to start
his work flow. A user can import a document from his computer or cloud storage and then
digitally sign it by himself or request signature from other users. After signing a document,
the system generates a unique QR Code which is attached to a document. A QR code
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ensures quick access to a document and easier signature verification7. Upon confirming
signature, the application collects information such as date and time, IP address, location
and web browser & system information.
The application of E-sign is available via web browser and via mobile apps for iOS and
Android. It provides simple document management without organizing into hierarchical
structures (i.e. folders) and no document versioning is possible either.
Accounts in both applications – DocuSign and E-sign – are created for single users, so
documents can only be shared in means of sending them between each other.
DocVerify
DocVerify is another system for collecting electronic signatures on a single document or
batch of documents at once. System supports multi-factor authentication and authenti-
cation over phone, where phone number must be verified prior its usage. During the call,
user’s voice is recorded, and fingerprinted record is later attached to the document. In cases
where identity verification is necessary, DocVerify utilizes knowledge based authentication8
over third party services.
Each page of a signed document is stamped with a date and time the document was
created, page number, unique bar code, and dynamically embedded watermark. Digital
signatures are FIPS 186-4 [39] compliant and in accordance to ISO 14533 [17], to assure
long term authenticity and validity of signatures. DocVerify utilizes PKI in accordance to
ISO/IEC 9594-8 and ITU-T X.509 [15, 53] standards. Secure document time-stamping as
described in RFC 3161 [1] is used as well, together with sequential time-stamping, making
forged document injection into the system extremely difficult. Moreover, all actions are
recorded in a tamper-proof audit trail.
Every document is encrypted with it’s own 256 bit AES key, symmetric keys are then
encrypted with 512 bit user’s private key (supposedly Elliptic Curve based). System is also
ISO/IEC 27001 certified and SSAE16 audited.
Enterprise version provides more functionality, such as document templating, integra-
tion into custom application or notary features.
Open eSignForms
Another tool Open eSignForms for document signing is not so widely used, but rich in
functionality [60]. It is an open source software developed by Yozons, Inc and is primarily
aimed for document management, templating, versioning and signing. It contains built-
in text editor with support for pre-made forms and form editor. Documents can be in a
testing and production stage, i.e. documents with work in progress and their final versions.
Documents are organized into the libraries and access to them is granted on per user basis.
Users do not have their own key pair or certificate. Instead, each document is signed by
private key of Open eSignForm installation containing IP address of signer, timestamp,
user’s name, email and ID. Software supports only work with structured documents (in
XML format) of built-in text editor. Structured documents can be generated from forms
or PDF files of original documents.
7After scanning a QR Code, a user is taken to the website, where he can verify signature validity.
8Authentication based on knowledge of secret personal information
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2.3 Version Control Systems
Version Control Systems [42] are systems primarily developed and used for a software source
control, versioning and collaboration, but can be also used for collaboration in any other
type of project. These systems usually provide managing of text files, but also support
managing of binary files. We can split these systems into two main categories, based on
scheme they use for content management to centralized (client-server) and decentralized
(distributed).
Centralized VCS
Centralized VCS use a concept of central repository holding main copy of a project together
with project’s whole history and serves as a reference copy for all users. Users can push their
files or changes into existing files (also called changesets) and other users can view those
changes and incorporate them into their own project repository. Some of the most popular
centralized VCS are SubVersion (SVN) [18], Concurrent Versioning System (CVS) [21]
or Team Foundation Server [36].
Distributed VCS
As opposed to a centralized Version Control Systems, in Distributed VCS there is no central
repository, since all repositories hold full history of a project (though one repository can be
chosen as a main, but it is not a rule). Probably two, most popular decentralized VCSs are
Git [55] and Mercurial [32].
All VCS have many features in common. Among the most popular ones belong possibil-
ity of branching a project and work in a new branch, viewing differences between different
file revisions, going back through history of project or commenting on changes being made.
Some systems like Git or Mercurial have support for digital signing of changsets using PKI,
so other users can verify their authenticity.
VCS are great tool for a collaboration on various types of projects, but they require
a lot of initial learning (have ”steep learning curve“) which can discourage, mostly, nontechnical users from their utilization. They are also inconvenient for use within law compa-
nies for absence of built-in support for structured text documents as OfficeOpenXML, Open
Document Format or Rich Text Format.
2.4 Cloud Solutions
Another category of systems aimed for a collaboration are general purpose cloud solutions,
e.g. Google with its service Google Docs or Microsoft with their SharePoint which in
connection with Microsoft Office suite gives its users powerful tool for content manage-
ment, document storing, sharing, presenting, project planning, managing etc. MS Share-
Point’s typical use case is deployment within single company, requiring server farm to install
into, and an IT person (or team) to manage such infrastructure. Because of this reason,
SharePoint is not suitable for individuals or smaller companies and thus MS Office 365,
providing most of SharePoint functionality but in cloud, will be described.
Google Docs [23] and Microsoft Office 365 [35] are very similar in a functionality
they offer. They are both cloud services, so users need only web browser to start using
them. Both ones offer applications for creating and editing structured text documents,
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spreadheets, presentations or to keep track of your notes, versioning of documents with
visual diffs (Google Docs only) and restore function. Inserting comments into documents
is supported as well, however, commenting on the whole document is not possible. Both
applications support adding digital signatures into documents, but only Microsoft Office
365 supports signing files and messages with your private key through Digital ID9 which is
provided upon user’s request. Document management is very similar to the management of
typical file systems with possibility to share documents with other users for a collaboration
purpose. Collecting signatures for single document is not built-in in either of them, since
it is not intended use case. Both ones support two factor authentication for their services.
Transmitted and stored data are encrypted with perfect forward secrecy [24, 34], which
means that compromising key in single session does not affect data security in previous or
future sessions.
The biggest advantages of described (and similar) cloud solutions are in complexity
and variety of tools and functions they provide with 100% portability, since everything is
available online. Negotiating on single document version can be, however, cumbersome,
since no simple solution for collecting signatures on documents is available.
9https://support.office.com/en-us/article/get-a-digital-ID-0eaa0ab9-b8a2-4a7e-828b-9bded6370b7b
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Chapter 3
Information Security Concepts
Since desired system for document versioning and signing can contain documents with
highly confidential information, providing high information security must be the one of the
top priorities regarding system design and implementation.
Chardetseva and Hilton [7] define Information Security as a multidisciplinary area
of study and professional activity which is concerned with the development and implemen-
tation of security countermeasures of all available types (technical, organizational, human-
oriented and legal) in order to keep information in all of its locations (within and outside
the organization’s perimeter) and, consequently, information systems where information is
created, processed, stored, transmitted and destructed, free from threats. In other words,
Information Security is concerned with protection of information of any kind (i.e. elec-
tronic, paper or verbal) and its critical elements including the systems and hardware which
use, store and transmit information.
Closely related to the Information Security is Information Assurance, defined in
similar way [7] as multidisciplinary area of study and professional activity which aims to
protect business by reducing risks associated with information and information systems by
means of a comprehensive and systematic management of security countermeasures, which
is driven by risk analysis and cost-effectiveness. Information Assurance can be seen as a
superset of Information Security with inclusion of other fields as well, as depicted in Figure
3.1.
Combined Information Assurance & Security form a knowledge area which incorpo-
rates the knowledge acquired from both fields, including all actions directed at keeping
information secure as well as the management of these actions.
3.1 CIA Triad
Information Security concepts are historically based on three characteristics of information
(also know as three pillars of Information Security) that give value to organizations: con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability – CIA Triad. Many authors put another information
characteristic – non-repudiation – to the same level with CIA Triad. CIA Triad and non-
repudiation has for long been basis for evaluating and implementing information security
regardless of underlying system [58].
Integrity of data is achieved when it is whole, complete and incorrupted. Corruption
can occur while information is being stored or transmitted and can be caused by technical
issue (corrupted medium, noise in transmission) or intentionally by (un)authorized user. By
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between Information Security and Information Assurance [25].
assuring integrity of information, we can ensure that modification was done by authorized
users only, in the way each modification should be, moreover, traceable and revertible. If
modification of data by unauthorized user would occur, then the modification could be
easily detected. For ensuring data integrity, file is typically distributed with its unique
message digest – hash (see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5).
Confidentiality ensures only users with knowledge of a key (i.e. authorized users) are
able to access information encrypted by this key. If unauthorized access to data occurs,
confidentiality is breached. Example of confidentiality breach is intentional or accidental
disclosure of private information or theft, achieved by breaking into system by an unpriv-
ileged user. Various methods can be utilized to achieve high information confidentiality.
Among most common are data encryption, strong passwords, two factor authentication or
even physical data isolation, e.g. by storing data on disconnected device or as a hard copy
only. Proper staff training can also highly improve information confidentiality.
Availability means that data are safely stored or transmitted in a way, that infras-
tructure is robust enough to deal with power outages, hardware failures, users’ mistakes as
well as with intentional attacks against it. In other words, availability ensures that data
are always available upon user request in required (or specified) format. Availability can
be best ensured by correct maintenance of deployed hardware and software, storing data
redundantly and/or on geographically isolate locations.
Non-repudiation means that user cannot deny action that he has intentionally done
before. User can for example sign document and later claim, that his private key or account
has been compromised. Non-repudiation in system is difficult to achieve, but if system is
well designed, then it can be harder for user to repudiate his own actions. Well design of a
system require e.g. timestamping or strong authentication. Another approach to prevent
repudiation is by deploying trusted third party (TTP). As a TTP, a forensic specialist to
analyze signature, or a notary to witness act of signing can be employed.
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3.2 From CIA Triad to IAS Octave
Over time, researchers and security specialist have pointed out [58, 44] that CIA triad is not
sufficient anymore to address current trends in the information security and proposed its ex-
tension. In 2013 after interviewing many leaders in information security area, Chardetseva
and Hilton [6] proposed extension of CIA triad by following four principles:
• Auditability – an ability of a system to monitor and log all actions performed by
every user as well as by machine. Auditability enables users and administrators to
trace arbitrary transaction in the system and perform checks of system behavior.
• Accountability – an ability of a system to keep users responsible for their actions.
Accountability in a system can be improved by keeping log of users’ actions and by
providing means to easily trace or search over them when necessary.
• Autenthicity/Trustworthiness – an ability of a system to verify identity and es-
tablish trust in a third party and information it provides. This can be for example
achieved by restricting access to a system to users that are verified and trusted by
existing system users.
• Privacy – A system should obey privacy legislation and it should enable individuals
to control their personal information (user-involvement). User’s personal information
should be used only for internal purposes and mustn’t be exposed without explicit
permission.
3.3 Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security
A Reference Model (RM) is an abstract framework for understanding significant relation-
ships among the entities of some environment. It enables the development of specific refer-
ence or concrete architectures using consistent standards or specifications supporting that
environment. A reference model consists of a minimal set of unifying concepts, axioms and
relationships within a particular problem domain, and is independent of specific standards,
technologies, implementations, or other concrete details [6].
Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS) described in this work
servesss as a conceptual framework for designing and implementing secure cryptographic
protocol and application built on it.
The RMIAS is depicted in Figure 3.2 and contains four dimensions:
Information System Security Life Cycle Dimension depicts security in various
stages of IS life cycle. RMIAS emphasis the need to address security through all stages of
IS development.
Information Taxonomy Dimension describes the nature of information being pro-
tected and defines four information attributes that are crucial to correctly estimate and
achieve security goals and countermeasures to be taken in order to avoid threats whose
goals addresses. Form of information can be electronic, paper or verbal. Information sen-
sitivity may change over system’s life cycle, for example publishing a file which was before
used only for internal purposes (e.g. disclosing application’s source code). Information
location varies often over time and may be either controlled – information is under full
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control of particular organization; partially controlled – information is physically stored at
party having contractual relationship with the organization (e.g. cloud provider, business
partner); or uncontrolled – information is not in controlled, nor in partially controlled lo-
cation. Information state defines state of information in every specific moment of its life
cycle. These states are creation, transmission, processing, storing and destruction. Security
of information should be handled equally at each state.
Information category is defined by combination of attributes form, state, sensitivity
and location, and serves as basis for the specification and selection of security goals and
countermeasures. If an employee creates an electronic document aimed for use in higher
management (sensitivity is internal use only), then this document is within controlled lo-
cation. If document is accidentally emailed out of organization, then it enters uncontrolled
location and since sensitivity remains for internal use only, information falls into dangerous
category. For such a case, countermeasures should be planned to prevent information falling
into this category (e.g. by warning user when private document is emailed to address not
in organization space).
Security Goals Dimension lists security goals applicable to system, where security
goal is desirable ability of system to resist specific category of threats. Set of security goals
that RMIAS tries to achieve is built upon IAS Octave described above. It should be noted,
that this list of security goals is not fixed and may change to reflect future changes in system
and possible threats.
Security Countermeasures Dimension contains four types of security counter-
measures: organizational, human-oriented, technical and legal. Technical countermeasures
refer to security aspects of system implemented in software or hardware. Examples are cryp-
tographic features, firewall, antivirus or biometric devices. Organization countermeasures
are meant to be an administrative activities which build secure environment, e.g. following
a security strategy, procedures, best practices, physical security etc. Human-oriented coun-
termeasures are intended to explain rationale behind given security instructions and relates
to users’ education, awareness, motivation, ethics etc. Legal countermeasures refer to use
of legislation for the purpose of information protection, for example to prove information
ownership, for enforcement of application of legal agreement over information, or copyright
laws.
Relationship Between RMIAS Dimensions
Figure 3.2 depicts RMIAS and relationship between its dimensions. Beginning from the top
left quadrant we first define current stage of Security Development Life Cycle. Then, we
have to consider every category of information relevant to our system followed by informa-
tion cataloguing, which together with prioritizing goals, contributes to higher completeness
of Information Security Policy Document (ISPD1). Security goals are then prioritised for
each information category which is based on the conducted risk analysis. Selection of secu-
rity countermeasures is then performed with emphasis on cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
Identified countermeasures should be then traced with consistency throughout all stages of
the security life cycle. Described model should be used in iterations for each stage of the
life cycle.
1ISPD is document containing rules and guidelines that must be followed to meet security requirements
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Figure 3.2: Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security [6].
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Chapter 4
Application Design
This chapter acquaints reader with core feature requirements for designed application and
a typical use case of the system in form of a sequence diagram.
Application is designed as a client-server one, where a client, represented by web browser,
will communicate with server over a secure channel. All the sensitive information will
be processed on the client side, such as key generation, document encryption or signing.
Server will serve as a storage for documents, signatures and other necessary data, and as
a user management system with additional functionality for comfortable collaboration on
documents.
For better understanding of the system design, it is necessary to introduce three core
entities present in the system and relationships among them: organizations, users and
documents. Organization is in the system created by system administrator, who will also
create1 it’s first user – Organization Administrator (OA). OA can then invite more users
to the system and assign them arbitrary permissions. OA can also assign permissions to
existing users of the system so they can participate in collaboration as well. Organization
can have one or more administrators (thus at least one user). User can be bound to the
zero or more organizations. Every document is bound to exactly one organization and can
not be transferred to another. Every user with bonding to an organization, can access
any document bound to this organization, if he has sufficient permissions to do so. User
permissions are described in greater detail in section User Management later in this chapter.
As the project is in early stage, the list of features described here may change and
further develop over time.
4.1 Document Management
Documents will be organized in a typical hierarchical structure, well known from file sys-
tems, allowing arbitrary depth for directory nesting. Every document in the system will
be encrypted with unique symmetric key, thus providing end-to-end encryption. This key
will be shared between all document’s collaborators, encrypted by user’s public key. No
other user, not even a system administrator will be able to access document in clear-text,
unless this feature is requested by a customer (e.g. to prevent loss of a document, when
only single user has access to it, and he forgets his key password). When user is removed
from collaboration on a document, his access to document is restricted and document key
encrypted by his public key is removed as well.
1By creating and sending an invitation.
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Till the end of this section we will assume that user is authorized for every action taken,
unless not stated otherwise.
Versioning and History. Negotiation of each document will run in iterations, where
each time new document version is uploaded, new iteration will start. In single iteration,
users can either sign or comment current version of a document. Every document can
be in one of three, non overlapping phases: In Progress, Approved or Rejected. When
new document is uploaded to the server, it is automatically labeled as In Progress. When
document reaches sufficient number of signatures (or other criterion is met), the negotiation
is over, current revision is marked as final and document as Approved. If document is no
longer required, owner, or other user with sufficient permissions, can mark it as Rejected,
and optionally also remove it from the system. Document can also be archived, so it will
no longer appear in the main directory structure, but will still be available to review in the
archive.
To prevent simultaneous modifications of a document by multiple users, user who want
to modify it will be able to temporarily lock it for updates from other users. Lock will be
visible to other users as well, to indicate that someone else is working on it. Lock can be
removed only by lock’s owner or after its expiration.
Users will also be able to comment individual versions of document, so document related
communication can be kept on single place.
For each document, either in process of negotiation, approved, or rejected, the system
will keep document’s history, representing all revisions of each document, list of contributors
and signatures, comments and all relevant metadata (time-stamps, access list and others).
History will be available for a review to each authorized user.
Signing and Signature Verification. Each user upon registration into the system,
receives his personal certificate which enables him to sign latest revision of any document
he has permission to sign. User may as well be marked as a mandatory signatory for a
document, which in effect causes, that document can not be marked as Approved untill
it is not signed by all mandatory signatories. User consents with content of document by
signing it. It goes without saying that all actions are transparent to a user, so he does not
have to deal with a key management at all.
Notifications. To speed up the process of negotiation, a notification will be sent to a user
after specific event occurs, over channel of user’s preference. For example, when document
has been signed or commented, user has been invited for collaboration, document has been
approved or rejected, and many others.
4.2 User Management
For the participation in a document negotiation process, it is necessary for a user to have
account in the system and sufficient access permissions for document.
User Permissions. When user is invited to collaborate to an organization, default set of
permissions is assigned to him. These permissions will be applied to every new document
that appears in directory structure. Permissions can however be changed at any time by
one of organiztion’s administrators or overwritten on per-document or per-directory basis.
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Set of permissions specifying actions that user can perform on document is as follows:
• View – user can only access documents for viewing;
• Comment – user can view and comment documents;
• Sign – user can view and sign documents;
• Modify – user can view and upload new version of document;
• Remove – user can view and remove document from the system.
Permissions can be arbitrarily mixed, but it is obvious, that some combinations doesn’t
have practical use.
For more practical access control, Role Based Access Control could be deployed, this is
however not supported by current design.
Apart from document permissions, user can also be allowed to invite new user for
collaboration. If user is labeled as an administrator, he can perform any action allowed
by design, without restrictions. Only administrator has power to modify default user’s
permissions. Per-document or per-directory permissions can be modified by its owner as
well.
User Authentication. Simple authentication via user name and password is not suf-
ficient for such sensitive information as a legal content. Therefore, additional form of
authentication is necessary. On each sign in to the system, a text message with a code will
be sent to a user’s phone. Received code together with user name and password will be
used to verify his identity by two factor authentication (knowledge, possession). Except
login password, user is also required to remember his key password, i.e. password by which
his private key is encrypted and stored on the server. On user registration, identity of a
user must be verified even more thoroughly – through a third trusted party.
User Registration. For a user being able to register into the system, he receives an
invitation email containing URL to registration form with pre-filled information. To access
this form, user must first enter secret code he receives to his mobile phone in SMS. To ensure
that only user with valid code can perform registration, registration form contains hidden
field signed by server, that is checked after submitting the form. User is then prompted to
enter additional information (full name, address), login password and key password. After
finishing the registration process, user is able to sign in to the system. Registration process
is also depicted on Figure 4.1.
Password Loss and Recovery. Situations, when user forgets his password are very
common. Mechanism, that would allow password recovery, is thus necessary. Similarly
to registration, login password can be recovered by sending an email to the user (and
secret code in SMS), containing URL to password recovery form. After confirmation, new
password will be set for the user.
If user forgets his key password, it is not possible to recover it, and new certificate must
be issued for him. Again, email containing URL for new certificate request (and secret code
in SMS), will be sent to the user, and after completion he will receive new certificate. At
this point, user doesn’t have access to any document, since no one has encrypted document
keys of documents he is supposed to access, with his public key. It is thus necessary to ask
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Figure 4.1: Sequence diagram of the user registration process.
one of Organization Administrators to perform this task (or system administrator, if he has
access to document keys).
4.3 Use Case
Typical use case for the system is illustrated in Figure 4.2 and goes as follows:
In the use case, we assume that both Ann and John are legitimate registered users of the
system and are logged into it. Imagine Ann needs to get a signature from John on document
D1. Ann creates a new case folder – Case1. Then, she invites John for collaboration on the
documents stored inside the folder and uploads D1 into Case1. John receives notifications
about the actions that Ann just did in his preferred way (email, SMS, phone call), enters
the system and downloads D1.
John sees that the document requires numerous changes, so he locks D1 and starts to
edit it. Notification about John’s activity is sent to Ann. Meanwhile, Ann also made some
changes to the D1, but since she didn’t lock the document, she is not able to update it
(even though she is the owner of it). Instead, she puts a comment to D1 which is forwarded
to John so he can incorporate her changes as well. John suddenly receives a notification
from the system, that his lock on D1 is about to expire and he is prompted to either release
the lock, enabling other users to work on D1, or upload its revised version. John needs
little more time for editing, therefore he renews the lock and then uploads revised version
of the D1. Ann is notified about the new revision, therefore she downloads the last two
revisions to see the differences. As she accepts the changes that John has made, she signs
the document with her private key.
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System then notifies both users collaborating on D1 about the approval of D1 by all
required parties (Ann and John) and the final version of D1 is considered legally valid and
signed. All collaborators can now (or at any point in time) review all document revisions,
history of signatures and comments.
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Figure 4.2: Use case of two users collaborating on single document in form of sequence
diagram.
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Chapter 5
Cryptographic Protocol Design
For long time, handwritten signatures have been used as a proof of authorship or agreement
on paper document. With emerge of computers, the ability to sign electronic documents
has emerged as well. In electronic documents, however, it is much easier to forge user’s
signature, as one can simply copy and paste signature from original signed document or
modify original document without leaving any trace of modification [50]. This chapter has
two goals. First one is to describe in high level Digital Signatures and their use in Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) as a mechanism for digitally signing and verifying signatures of an
electronic documents. Second is to formalize designed protocol by presenting it in common
syntax.
5.1 Digital Signatures in Public Key Infrastructure
We use Digital Signatures for the purpose of document signing in digital environment.
Directive 1999/93/EC [13] of the European Parliament and of the Council defines digital
signature as a data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with
other electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication. The most algorithms
for digital signatures are based on public key cryptography considering each user has pair
of keys: public and private. Private key is known only to the owner and it serves mainly for
the purpose of signing documents. Public key is available to anyone for verifying authorship
of signature and document’s integrity.
For proving association of public keys to their owners, the electronic document known
as a Digital Certificate is issued and made publicly available. Digital certificate contains
user’s public key, identity information, signature of an authority that verified user’s identity
and identification of issuing Certification Authority, date of certificate revocation and much
more information defined by used standard1.
In the most regions and countries around the world, legislation gives digital signatures
same weight and legal effect like for handwritten signature. For example in European Union
it is aforementioned Directive 1999/93/EC, while in USA Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act. [52] from 2000 and Uniform Electronic Transactions Act [38]
from 1999.
1Currently most popular standard in use is ITU-T X.509 which contains not only certificate format
specification but complete set of recommendations for designing and implementing Public Key Infrastructure.
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5.1.1 Proposed PKI Approach
Public Key Infrastructure systems are complex distributed systems based on the public/pri-
vate key cryptography, which are responsible for giving users enough information to make
reasonable trust judgments about each other [5, 33]. Elementary entities present in Public
Key Infrastructure according to Scheirer [49] are:
• Certificate Authority (CA) is an entity that issues certificates to users by signing
users’ public keys by CA’s own private key; Certificate of this CA can be either signed
by higher level CA or by itself (self-signed certificate);
• Registration Authority (RA) is an entity which verifies user’s identity and sends
her public key and other information required by a standard to CA to sign;
• Verification Authority (VA) – upon request it provides valid certificate of a person
in query or notify user whether an error or non standard situation occurs, e.g. if a
certificate does not exist for given user, then certificate expired or has been revoked;
and
• End user is an authorized user of a system.
The same entities will be considered in PKI described in this work. Single entity can take a
place of all three authorities, Certificate, Registration and Verification Authority, as is the
case of designed application.
Simplified procedure for digitally signing and verifying document in described PKI of
designed system is depicted in Figure 5.1 and contains following steps:
1. Alice generates public/private key pair and sends her public key and credentials (SMS
code, full name, email and other required information) to Registration Authority in
form of signed Certificate Signing Request.
2. RA verifies provided credentials (i.e. via SMS and email) and sends Alice’s request
to CA for signing .
3. Certificate Authority creates and signs Alice’s certificate with its own private key and
sends signed certificate to the Alice and VA.
4. Alice queries the VA for Bob’s certificate.
5. Assuming Bob is registered user and system holds his valid certificate, VA sends the
certificate to the Alice.
6. Alice then:
(a) creates a document;
(b) using cryptographic hash function [45], e.g. MD5 or SHA-256 she creates a unique
message digest of a document (document hash) and encrypts it using her private
key – creates digital signature;
(c) generates symmetric key and encrypts document using this key;
(d) encrypts symmetric key using Bob’s public key obtained from his certificate, and
continues to the next step.
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7. Alice attaches encrypted hash and encrypted symmetric key to the encrypted docu-
ment and stores it to the shared Document Repository.
8. Bob downloads encrypted document, signature and encrypted symmetric key from
the repository.
9. Bob queries the VA for Alice’s certificate.
10. Assuming Alice is registered user and system holds her valid certificate, VA sends the
certificate to the Bob.
11. Bob then:
(a) decrypts symmetric key using his private key;
(b) decrypts document using decrypted symmetric key;
(c) applies the same hash function to the document as Alice did, then decrypts
document’s signature using Alice’s public key, compares the results and continues
to the next step.
12. If both digests have the same value, then Bob can assume Alice is really the author
of the document and it has not been tampered, assuming that Alice’s private key and
account have not been compromised.
13. If the digests differ, then either the document or signature or both have been modified
by an attacker. In this case, Bob will not trust the document.
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Figure 5.1: High level scheme of Public Key Infrastructure.
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5.2 Formal Protocol Design
Cryptographic protocol is described in notation inspired by common syntax [51]. Meaning
of symbol used in notation is as follows:
A, B users of the system
D arbitrary document, Dv its particular version v
U all users in the system
UD users that collaborate on document D; UD ⊆ U ; A, B ∈ UD
U sigDv users that signed Dv, U
sig
Dv
⊆ UD
S server storing documents, certificates and signatures
T time-stamp
KPA public-private key pair of user A, KP publicA its public (or private) part
KD symmetric key for encryption/decryption of associated document D
KPA symmetric key for encryption/decryption of KP
private
A , derived from pass-
word P
IVDv initialization vector, unique for each version v of associated document D
IVA initialization vector associated with KPA
CA certificate of user A
CSRA Certificate Signing Request of user A
H(X) hash of the value X
{X}K value X encrypted by symmetric key K
{X}KP public value X encrypted by public key KP public
{X}KP private value X encrypted by private key KP private
Q(subject) query the server for data specified in the subject, written in free syntax
For simplicity we will assume that all users are in the same organization and they have
all necessary permissions.
5.2.1 User Management
Registration
1. A→ S : CSRA, {H(CSRA)}KP privateA , {KP privateA }KPA , IVA
2. S → A : CA
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Explanation
1. Assuming user A received valid invitation, he generates his own key-pair, KPA, cre-
ates Certificate Signing Request, CSRA, and its hash, H(CSRA). User A creates
initialization vector IVA and provides secret password, P , from which key KPA is
derived. KPA and IVA are then used, to encrypts A’s private key, KP
private
A . KPA is
derived from P every time user needs to decrypt his private key. A then sends CSRA;
its encrypted hash {H(CSRA)}KP privateA ; encrypted private key {KP privateA }KPA , and
initialization vector IVA, necessary for its decryption, to the server.
2. Server generates new certificate, CA, from CSRA, stores it with rest of the received
data in its database, and returns CA to the user A.
Additional Notes
• CSRA is in accordance to PKCS#10 [40] standard, containing following attributes:
– commonName=<full user’s name>;
– emailAddress=<user’s email address>;
– countryName=CZ;
– localityName=Brno; and
– organizationName=<organization’s name>.
It further contains single extension, subjectAlternativeName=<email address>,
and user’s public key, KP publicA .
• CA is generated from CSRA and follows X.509 standard, where Subject Name’s fields
contain previously mentioned attributes.
• KPA is public/private RSA2 key-pair and it’s modulus length is always 2048 bit.
• KPA is 128 bit symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard cipher in Counter Block
Chaining mode (AES-CBC) [20]. It is derived from password P provided by user,
using Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2), as defined in PKCS#5
[30].
• H uses Secure Hash Algorithm producing 256 bit long fingerprint (SHA-256).
• For enveloping private key material, PKCS#8 [31] is used, which is futher enveloped
into PKCS#12 [37] structure.
5.2.2 Document Management
First Document Version Upload
1. A→ S : Q(list of all users)
2. S → A : U
3. A→ S : Q(certificates of all users in UD, where UD is selected from U by A)
2Name is derived from initial letters of its creators’ surnames: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman
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4. S → A : Cu∀u ∈ UD
5. A→ S : {D1}KD, IVD1 ,
A→ S ::{KD}KP publicu ∀u ∈ UD
Explanation
1. User A queries the server for list of all users.
2. Server returns list of all users, U .
3. User A select collaborators on the document D from U as UD, and queries server for
their certificates.
4. Server returns certificates of all users specified in UD.
5. A generates new document key, KD, initialization vector IV1 and encrypts D1 using
KD and IVD1 ; A encrypts KD for all users in UD with their public keys obtained from
their certificates. A then sends {D1}KD, its respective initialization vector, IVD1 , and
KD, encrypted by each collaborator’s public key, to the server S, which subsequently
stores received data.
Any Subsequent Version Upload
1. A→ S : Q(necessary data to upload new version of document D)
2. S → A : {KP privateA }KPA , IVA, {KD}KP publicA
3. A→ S : IVDv , {Dv}KD
Explanation
1. User A queries the server S for data necessary to upload new version of document D.
2. Server returns encrypted private key of user A, {KP privateA }KPA , initialization vector
IVA necessary for its decryption; and encrypted document key, {KD}KP publicA . A
decrypts his private key and document key, generates new initialization vector, IVDv ,
and encrypts Dv using KD and IVDv .
3. A sends initialization vector IVDv and encrypted document {Dv}KD, to the server,
which saves it to the database.
Additional Notes
• KD is a 128 bit symmetric AES key in Galois Counter block Mode (AES-GCM) [48],
providing data authenticity and confidentiality.
• Encryption and decryption operations are performed using RSAES-OAEP algorithm,
as defined in PKCS#1 [47].
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5.2.3 Signature Management
Sign Document
1. A→ S : Q(necessary data to sign document Dv)
2. S → A : {Dv}KD, {KD}KP publicA , IVDv ,
S → A ::{KP privateA }KPA , IVA
3. A→ S : {H(Dv), T}KP privateA
Explanation
1. User A queries server S for all the necessary data to sign document Dv.
2. S returns encrypted document, {Dv}KD with initialization vector IVDv ; encrypted
document key, {KD}KP publicA ; and encrypted private key of user A, {KP privateA }KPA
with IVA.
3. A decrypts his private key, document key, and document; creates hash of Dv and
timestamp T , and encrypts both using his private key, as {H(Dv), T}KP privateA , ef-
fectively creating signature of document Dv. A then sends signature to S which stores
it.
Verify Document Signatures
1. A→ S : Q(necessary data to verify all signatures of document Dv)
S → A : {Dv}KD, {KD}KP publicA , IVDv ,
S → A ::{KP privateA }KPA , IVA,
S → A ::{H(Dv), T}KP privateu , Cu ∀u ∈ U sigDv
Explanation
1. A queries server S for all necessary data to verify all signatures of Dv
2. S returns encrypted document, {Dv}KD with initialization vector IVDv ; encrypted
document key, {KD}KP publicA ; encrypted private key of user A, {KP privateA }KPA with
IVA; and signatures of all the signatories of document Dv and their certificates.
A then decrypts his private key, document key, and document; decrypts all signatures
with signatories’ public keys, obtained from their certificates; creates hash of Dv,
H(Dv), and compares it with each hash from decrypted signatures. If any of hashes
doesn’t match, either document, or signature, or both has been tampered by an
attacker.
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Additional Notes
• T contains current date and time in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
• H uses Secure Hash Algorithm producing 256 bit fingerprint (SHA-256)
• Signing and verification operations are performed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 algo-
rithm, as defined in PKCS#1.
• Document signatures are detached, and enveloped using Cryptographic Message Syn-
tax (CMS)[26].
• Validity of signatures is currently verified only against user’s certificate, verification
against chain of certificates (chain of trust) is thus not possible.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
System is implemented as a client-server application, communicating using traditional
request-response schema. Client runs from web browser (also called thin client) and its
functionality is implemented in JavaScript. Thanks to this, it is theoretically possible
to use application from any device or operating system with graphical interface and web
browser supporting JavaScript and Web Cryptography API.
On server side, Python application accessible over HTTP server and Web Server Gate-
way Interface (WSGI) is running. WSGI is universal interface enablig communication be-
tween python application and arbitrary web server, as Apache, IIS or nginx. Schema of
such system is depicted on Figure 6.1.
Communication is performed over secured HTTP channel, synchronously and asyn-
chronously.
Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) requests are used for most operations,
except loading new page or reloading current one. Uploading or signing a document are
typical examples of asynchronous requests, where user is notified upon operation’s success
or failure. All AJAX requests are sent to URL, whose path is prefixed with resources/
keyword. Every path specifies certain resource, to which client can request access. HTTP
requests can be of type GET, POST, DELETE, or PUT. Messages in asynchronous communication
are formatted as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)1 formatted data, with exception of
form loading. All responses contain mandatory keys status and message, specifying result
1JSON is a lightweight, easily human-readable data-interchansge format, consisting of key:value pairs
Figure 6.1: Client - Server Architecture using WSGI Interface
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of operation and its details. Response can also contain one optional key, data, containing
custom data payload specific to each resource. Format of request varies, depending on
requested resource. Thanks to standardized message syntax, both client and server can be
developed independently, as far as they support common communication protocol.
6.1 Web Server Application
Server side is implemented in Python programming language and built on Django frame-
work [8]. PostgreSQL [54] database is used for holding application’s relational data. Post-
greSQL is an open-source relational database management system, not controlled by any
organization and implementing most of the functionality of SQL standard while supporting
many custom extensions.
6.1.1 Django
Django is an Open Source, multi-platform framework written in Python, focused to ease
development of web sites. Django is implemented as a Model-view-controller (MVC) ap-
plication, consisting of three essential components: model, view and template. Simplified
schema of these components and their communication is depicted on Figure 6.2.
Model in Django is an Object-relational mapper (ORM), serving as a source of data
for application. Models serves as a proxy object for access to database and every operation
on database is thus performed via this model. Every model is a Python class that is mapped
to a single database table, where each attribute represents a database field (column).
View handles most of the application’s custom logic, and in terms of MVC it plays
role of a controller. It describes the data that gets presented to the user, but not how they
are presented. View is basically a Python callback function for particular URL, specifying
action to be performed when user makes a request to given URL. Requests are forwarded
to correct view by URL dispatcher, which has access to predefined list that binds URL to
a view.
Every view in application is subclassed from Django’s TemplateView2, containing list
of allowed HTTP methods for this view and definition of python method to handle the
request. In general, following actions are performed, after view receives a request from
dispatcher:
1. check user permissions for requested action;
2. check parameters sent in request;
3. perform requested operation; and
4. form a response and send it to the user.
For better illustration of how forwarding an HTTP request in Django works, two code
listings are present. Listing 6.1 contains excerpt from Django’s dispatcher config. Selected
entry matches any request made to ’resources/document/version/’ and forwards it to
2TemplateView is not only view class available, but serves best for application’s needs. Moreover, it is
also possible to define view as a function – function based view.
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as_view method of DocumentVersionHandler class, which according to type of request
internally calls another method, i.e. get or post.
Listing 6.2 contains definition of post method, handling any HTTP POST request
dispatched to DocumentVersionHandler view. In following text, numbers in parenthesis
denotes line numbers in Listing 6.2. By inheriting from LoginRequiredMixin (1), it is en-
sured that only authenticated user can access this method. Variable http_method_names
(3) specifies allowed methods for this view. Other HTTP methods will return HTTP Not
Allowed response. transaction.atomic (5) decorator ensures, that either all database
operations called within a method will be successfully performed, or none of them. After
pulling data from request, authorization check is performed (13) to ensure that user has
permissions to modify this document, which is subsequently saved to database. JSON en-
coded response is returned every time, on both success and failure, with correct HTTP
status set (18, 37, 43).
1 urlpatterns = [
2 ...
3 url(r’^resources/document/version/$’,
4 views.DocumentVersionHandler.as_view(),
5 name=’res_documentversion’),
6 ...
7 ]
Listing 6.1: URL dispatcher, forwarding document version upload and download request
to correct view.
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1 class DocumentVersionHandler(LoginRequiredMixin, TemplateView):
2 """Handle operations over custom document version."""
3 http_method_names = [’get’, ’post’]
4
5 @transaction.atomic
6 def post(self, request):
7 """Process new file from the user."""
8 try:
9 document_id = int(request.POST.pop(’document_id’)[0])
10 iv = request.POST.pop(’iv’)[0]
11 data = request.POST.pop(’data’)[0]
12 size = request.POST.pop(’size’)[0]
13 if not request.user.can_modify(document_id):
14 response = {
15 ’status’: ’Fail’,
16 ’message’: "You don’t have permissions to add new document",
17 }
18 return JsonResponse(response, status_code=403)
19 dc = DocumentContainer.objects.get(id=document_id)
20 current_version = dc.current_version().version
21 dv = DocumentVersion(
22 document=dc,
23 user=request.user,
24 content=data,
25 iv=iv,
26 version=current_version+1,
27 size=size)
28 dv.save()
29 response = {
30 ’status’: ’OK’,
31 ’message’: ’’,
32 ’data’: {
33 ’version’: dv.version,
34 ’size’: dv.size
35 }
36 }
37 return JsonResponse(response)
38 except IndexError:
39 response = {
40 ’status’: ’Fail’,
41 ’message’: ’Incorrect parameters.’
42 }
43 return JsonResponse(response, status_code=400)
Listing 6.2: Example of view class handling document upload.
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Figure 6.2: Simplified Model of Django Framework
Template specifies the form of data presented to the user and in terms of MVC,
template roughly stands for view. Template is composed of static parts (typically HTML),
and parts that specify, how dynamic content will be rendered to the user – filters. Filters
allows us to use conditional statements, loops, substitutions, and many other directives,
and thus move logic responsible for data presentation to the template.
6.1.2 Database Model
Database contains 12 custom tables and 7 tables implicitly created by Django. Every
custom model, except User, is subclassed from Django’s Model class, allowing to make
database queries from model. Database schema in form of an entity relationship diagram
is depicted on the Figure 6.3 and description of individual models/tables and their fields is
as follows:
User model represents single user in the system. Every user is uniquely identified by
ID, email or phone, where value of last two fields can change over time. Other
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mandatory attributes are name, publicKey and encryptedPrivateKey. Private key is
encrypted using secret password, and if key is forgotten, new certificate must be issued
to the user and previous certificate revoked. Last two fields are optional address
field and automatically generated dateCreated key containing date and time of user
registration. User model is subclass of Django’s AbstractBaseUser class. This
inheritance enables us to specify custom properties for user and at the same time
makes it possible to conveniently use default Django’s authentication system.
Organization holds information about single organization in system. It is uniquely iden-
tified by ID, email or phone. dateCreated and address fields have same properties
as in User model.
Document represents abstract view of document in the system. Every document is iden-
tified by ID and attached to organization by foreign key relation. Other mandatory
fields are path and name specifying full path to document in tree and document’s
name respectively3 status specifies current state of document – In Progress, Re-
jected or Approved. lockOwner, lockedFrom and lockedTo keeps information about
who, since and till when holds lock on the document, if any. archivedFlag and
dateArchived indicates, whether document has been moved to archive and when.
Model also contains field dueDate, specifying deadline for document to be approved
and optional description field.
DocumentVersion holds information about concrete version of document and is uniquely
identified by its ID field. Every document must be referenced from at least one
documentVersion through document field as a foreign key. Model also contains ref-
erence to user, who created the version and thus identifies owner of the document
(via owner of first document’s version). versionNumber holds document’s version
number, with first starting at one and is incremented by one for every next version.
documentContent field keeps document as base644 string encoding BER5 file. For in-
dicating document’s validity (data can be e.g. malformed or irrelevant), validityFlag
is present. Actual size of raw document (i.e. not base64 encoded, nor encrypted) is
stored in size field and finally in initializationVector is stored initialization vec-
tor necessary for document decryption.
DefaultUserPermissions defines many-to-many relationship between user and organi-
zation, and every relation in the model is uniquely identified by their combination
(referenced via user and organization fields). Model holds permissions for user in
related organization in fields superuser and canInvite, which define whether user
has administrator rights and whether can invite new user to join related organization
in the system. Model also holds default document permissions for user, which can
be overwritten for each document in DocumentUserPermissions table. These permis-
sions are canView, canSign, canComment, canModify, and canRemove, where name
indicates action to be taken.
DocumentUserPermissions defines many-to-many relationship between user and doc-
ument, and holds user’s permissions on related document. It is uniquely identified
by combination of user and document fields, referencing user and document. In
3Currently, path processing is not implemented, so all documents are stored in ”same directory“.4base64 is encoding schema for representing binary data as an ASCII string.
5Basic Encoding Rules, BER is set of rules for representing ASN.1 objects as strings of ones and zeros.
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encryptedDocumentKey field is stored symmetric key encrypted by user’s public key,
necessary for decrypting document.
Certificate model holds list of user’s certificates, where only one at time can be valid.
Relation in model is identified by unique ID field. Owner of certificate is referenced
by user field and validity of certificate is indicated by validityFlag. Certificate
itself is stored in certificate field, as a base64 string encoding BER file.
Signature model holds detached user’s signature for given version of document. user and
documentVersion fields references signed user and version of document, and their
combination is unique (i.e. user can not sign same document more than once). Model
also holds date and time when signature was made in timestamp field. signature
field holds signature as base64 string encoding BER file.
MandatorySignator defines users, whose signatures are mandatory for approval of re-
lated document. User and document are referenced by fields user and document,
together making up a private key.
Comment contains all comments added by arbitrary user to specific version of document.
Relation in model is uniquely identifined by ID. user and documentVersion fields
reference comment’s owner and commented documentVersion, dateCreated contains
date and time of posting comment, and in comment is stored comment’s content.
Action serves as basic structure for keeping track of actions performed on a document. It
is uniquely identified by its ID field and in user and documentVersion are referenced
related action’s originator and version of document accessed. In actionPerformed
is stored what action has been taken on document and in datePerformed is stored
when it was performed.
Invitation field stores necessary data for user to register in the system. Invitation is
identified by unique ID and in organization field references organization into which
user is invited. name specifies name of the invitee, email stores email address used
to which invitation is sent, and phone stores phone number to which secret code
is sent. expiration specifies when will invitation expire, if user will not register
into the system. uuid holds 32 characters long unique identifier used to compose
registration link, and secretCode stores code, that must be entered upon accessing
registration page. Model also contains fields, that specify default user permissions
in system, later stored in DefaultUserPermissions table – superUser, canInvite,
canView, canComment, canSign, canModify, canRemove. Invitation is automatically
deleted on expiration or after successful registration.
Implicit models holds additional data that Django operates on. These are users’ and
groups’ permissions specifying access model, list of active sessions, list of migrations
that were applied to the database, admin log with information about administrators’
actions, list of tables with details, and possibly other information as well.
6.2 Client Application
Client side application logic is implemented in JavaScript language. For cryptographic
functionality, WebCrypto API [56] is used, currently available in all major desktop web
browsers for GNU/Linux, Microsoft Windows and OS X.
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Figure 6.3: Entity Relationship Model of the System
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Figure 6.4: Communication between JavaScript libraries and the server.
The Web Cryptography API defines a low-level interface for interacting with crypto-
graphic key material that is managed or exposed by user agents. The API itself is agnostic
of the underlying implementation of key storage, but provides a common set of interfaces
that allow web applications to perform operations such as signature generation and veri-
fication, hashing and verification, encryption and decryption, without requiring access to
the raw keying material.
For operations related to Public Key Infrastructure, PKI.js [22] library is used. PKI.js
is an open-source pure JavaScript library build on WebCrypto API supporting wide range
of current cryptographic standards. Cryptographic structures described in Chapter 5 are
represented as JavaScript objects using ASN.1 notation. Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) is a method of specifying abstract objects in Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
architecture. It is flexible notation that allows one to define a variety data types, from
simple types such as integers and bit strings to structured types such as sets and sequences,
as well as complex types defined in terms of others [29].
Another JS library utilized in project is jQuery [28], used mainly for handling asyn-
chronous requests to the server and for most of the Document Object Model (DOM) ma-
nipulations. Flow of communication between JavaScript libraries, web page, and server is
depicted in Figure 6.4.
Web application provides user with simple interface, allowing him to register in the
system, basic document and document version manipulations, sign documents, verify sig-
natures, review collaboration history and also comparison of textual documents. When
user tries to access document, private key for document decryption is downloaded from
the server and user is prompted to enter password to decrypt it. On success, private key,
together with certificate, is stored as a session storage variable. Session storage lasts for as
long as the browser is open and survives over page reloads and restores. Opening a page
in a new tab or window will cause a new session to be initiated, which differs from how
session cookies work.
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Chapter 7
Security Analysis
Security is essential property of the system, especially when dealing with highly sensitive
data. This chapter reviews application in terms of RMIAS model and analyzes protection
against most common attacks aimed to web applications. As a main source of informa-
tion on attacks and protection against them was used Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) [43], which is worldwide not-for-profit charitable organization focused
on improving the security of a software.
7.1 RMIAS Analysis
During application development, two stages of IS life cycle has been identified: first one
includes application & protocol design and second is implementation.
Since RMIAS is aimed primarily to information systems deployed within a company,
not every aspect of RMIAS is applicable to developed application. Some restrictions were
thus applied:
• all the information that system handles is in electronic form;
• sensitivity of all documents is considered as arbitrary;
• location of all information is set to partially controlled, since we assume its deployment
in the cloud and no direct way of exporting document from system (e.g sending as an
email) exists; and
• security countermeasures are restricted only to technical ones.
In both stages (design and implementation), each of five possible states of information has
been considered, and technical countermeasures has been analyzed for every security goal.
Table 7.1 summarizes countermeasures that has been taken to achieve security goals in the
system. Some goals are however not applicable to a certain category of information, e.g. it
doesn’t make sense to try to achieve privacy in process of creating an information in the
system. ISPD document in real deployment would include much broader range of security
policies.
7.2 Attack Vectors
Following list of analyzed attacks is created from WhiteHat’s 2015 Website Security Statis-
tics Report [57] and OWASP’s top 10 list, identifying some of the most critical risks facing
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Information
State
Security Goal Applied Countermeasure
creation
confidentiality authorization, end-to-end encryption
integrity end-to-end encryption
non-repudiation user authentication, PKI
availability database controls
privacy not applicable
auditability server logs, logging user actions
accountability logging user actions
authenticity
& trustworthiness
user identity verification
processing
confidentiality end-to-end encryption
integrity end-to-end encryption
non-repudiation user authentication, PKI
availability database controls
privacy not applicable
auditability server logs, user actions logging
accountability logging user actions
authenticity
& trustworthiness
user identity verification
storage
confidentiality end-to-end encryption, database access protection
integrity end-to-end encryption, database controls
non-repudiation user authentication, PKI
availability database controls
privacy not applicable
auditability server logs, user actions logging
accountability user actions logging
authenticity
& trustworthiness
user identity verification
transmission
confidentiality end-to-end encryption, encrypted connection
integrity end-to-end encryption, encrypted connection
non-repudiation not applicable
availability not applicable
privacy not applicable
auditability server logs, user actions logging
accountability user actions logging
authenticity
& trustworthiness
not applicable
destruction
confidentiality end-to-end encryption, database controls
integrity not applicable
non-repudiation user actions logging
availability not applicable
privacy not applicable
auditability server log, user actions logging
accountability user actions logging
authenticity
& trustworthiness
user identity verification
Table 7.1: Simplified ISPD of the system, created using RMIAS method, where only
technical countermeasures are applied.
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organizations.
Insuffiecent Transport Layer Protection. This type of attack typically exploits miss-
ing or improperly configured Transport Layer Security (TLS), or vulnerabilities discovered
in TLS cryptographic libraries, such as OpenSSL [19].
Successful protection against this attack lies in requiring secured connection for all traffic
to/from the server, proper TLS configuration, and most recent version of critical software
with latest bug fixes deployed. It is however not possible to protect against unknown or
non-disclosed bugs.
Information Leakage. An information leak occurs when system data or debugging in-
formation leaves the program through an output stream or logging function, revealing
potentially sensitive information, or information that can help adversary with further ex-
ploration of the system. Sensitive information can leak from the server in several ways, some
most common are through data queries, error messages, transmission of sensitive data and
unhandled exception on the server.
To avoid this type of attack, we must ensure that all error messages that leave the server
are parsed with any sensitive information removed and that all exceptions are correctly
handled. Django largely helps with this task by providing default templates when error or
exception occurs on the server.
Sensitive Data Exposure. Most security flaws in this category raises from not encrypt-
ing sensitive data.
All communication between server and client is encrypted, moreover, potentially most
sensitive data, documents, are encrypted on client side, so even server provider doesn’t have
access to them.
Insufficient Authorization. This category of attacks exploit missing or insufficient
check of permissions. Attack is possible, if unathorized external user can access or even
modify content intended only for authorized users, by crafting a custom request, modifying
request’s parameters, or possibly in some other way. Similarly, regular system user could
access or modify content that he isn’t authorized to.
In application, authorization checks are performed on both, client and server side. On
client side, protection is achieved only by not displaying controls/objects (security by obscu-
rity), while on server side, actual check of user’s permissions is performed for every request
accessing some protected resource. No attack to the system from this category is known.
Injection Flaws. Injection flaws occur when an application sends malicious data to an
interpreter, which subsequently executes them. Among injection flaws, SQL injection is
most prevalent type of attack, where malicious user is able to execute arbitrary SQL code
on a database. This can result in records being deleted, modified, or in data leakage.
Application communicates with database solely over Django’s ORM and doesn’t contain
any custom queries. Since underlying database driver escapes all the queries made over
ORM, no SQL injection should be possible, as no vulnerability of this kind is known in
Django’s ORM. Another code interpreter on server, Python, does not execute any code
provided by client, so no injection is possible in this case as well.
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Cross Site Scripting. Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks allow a user to inject client side
scripts into the browsers of other users. This is usually achieved by storing the malicious
scripts in the database where it will be retrieved and displayed to other users (persistent
XSS), or by getting users to click a link which will cause the attacker’s JavaScript to be
executed by the user’s browser (reflected XSS). However, XSS attacks can originate from
any untrusted source of data, such as cookies or Web services, whenever the data is not
sufficiently sanitized before including in a page.
Since Django provides protection against XSS by escaping specific characters in its
templating mechanism, it provides protection against most attacks of this type. Moreover,
application provides only the one entry point, the registration of user, where data can be
submitted to the server by outsider.
For regular system user, there is more ways he can post malicious data to the server. All
data, before presented back to a user, is somehow processed though, making attack more
difficult. Imagine situation, when an attacker discovers vulnerability in PKI.js, allowing
him to append malicious code to the signature, that would execute on every verification of
this signature, without user noticing it. Attacker then could, for example, craft apparently
valid signature containing malicious code, that would send him private key of every user
who verifies this signature. To eliminate this type of attack, additional data check should
be performed on the server, e.g signature verification.
Session Fixation. The session fixation attack belongs into a class of session hijacking
attacks, which steals the established session between the client and the Web Server after
the user logs in. In session fixation, attacker first establishes valid session to a server and
then tricks user to login to server using this session. As with most other attacks, server
must contain vulnerability which allows it.
Django provides full support for anonymous sessions, and currently there is no know
session related vulnerability that would make session fixation attack possible. Sophisticated
attacker could however hijack user’s session by exploiting some other system’s vulnerability,
i.e. by XSS attack.
Brute Force. A brute force attack can manifest itself in many different ways, but pri-
marily consists in an attacker configuring predetermined values, making requests to a server
using those values, and then analyzing the response.
In implemented system, brute force attack could be used to guess user name and pass-
word to enter the system, this would be however too computationally expensive and can be
easily avoided by incurring some minimum amount of time between consecutive login at-
tempts. Brute force attack can also used to discover hidden pages on website or for testing
various request parameters. This attack is not applicable, since most of the Djano views
require login to access it. Only exceptions are index, login and registration page. The last
one, registration, is protected against posting data from untrusted sources, as described in
Chapter 5.
Content Spoofing. Content spoofing, also referred to as content injection or virtual
defacement, is an attack targeting a user made possible by an injection of vulnerability
in a web application. This type of attack similar to XSS attack, but instead of executing
malicious code on client side, uses other techniques to modify user’s page.
Since similar protection as against XSS can be applied, application doesn’t seem to be
vulnerable to this type of attack.
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Cross Site Request Forgery. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that
forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they’re
currently authenticated, or in other words, submitting a malicious request to the server.
Django provides protection against most types of CSRF attacks, by setting a CSRF
cookie to a random value, that other sites doesn’t have access to. New CSRF cookie is
generated each time user logs in to the application. This ensures that only data that have
originated from trusted domains can be used to post data to the server, since cookie is
present in each query. CSRF cookie does not have to be present in so called safe methods,
which doesn’t make any modification to the server, such as GET, HEAD, OPTIONS and TRACE.
URL Redirector Abuse. URL Redirector Abuse exploits redirecting functionality of
web application, where incoming request is redirected to an alternate resource. If alternate
resource is not checked, malicious link can be forged redirecting to attacker’s website.
Application is not vulnerable to this type of attack, since it doesn’t provide automatic
redirection to any external site.
Predictable Resource Location. This attack exploits easy to guess names of resources
for gaining access to them. This is similar to previously described brute force attack with
same solution.
Insufficient Authentication. Attacks in this category mostly stems from weak pass-
words used or transmitting clear-text passwords over insecure channel.
To avoid this type of attack, system requires user to use strong password for login to the
system as well as for private key encryption. Two factor authentication will be supported
in case of production deployment.
Directory Indexing. A directory listing provides an attacker with the complete index
of all the resources located inside the server root directory. Although allowing visitor to
list files in web server’s root is not direct security risk, it’s good practice to disable it, if
listing is not necessary for usage of application.
Abuse of Functionality. It should be ensured, that no software functionality can be
abused to perform a function not intended by the developer. Abuse of functionality is
strongly dependent on the design and implementation for application functions and features.
The best way to mitigate potential functionality abuses, is to maintain set of tests stretching
as much functionality of application as possible. Application currently contains limited set
of unit tests, not covering most of the functionality, and needs to be extended.
As set of application’s features is limited, there is currently no known bug allowing
abuse of functionality.
Insufficient Password Recovery. Weak password recovery processes allow stronger
password authentication schemes to be bypassed, proper password recovery technique is
thus essential. Multiple options thus should be available to recovery a user password, but
none of them sending new password to the user directly.
Currently, application does not support login password recovery at all. This feature
is however necessary for production deployment. Recovery of the password for access to
private key is not, and will never be supported, since no mechanism exists to achieve this
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task. In case user forgets password to his private key, he must generate new key pair and
request a new certificate.
Other attacks. Whole new category of attacks stems from vulnerabilities that are specific
to cloud infrastructure and must be considered when deploying system on th cloud. Some
of most common vulnerabilities in cloud are broken authentication into virtual machine or
web console, insecure API, threat of virtual machine escape, and other dangers, that are
direct consequences of sharing common resources.
Another attack, not directed to web application but to client’s machine is also possible.
If attacker is regular user of the system, he can post document containing malicious code,
that is executed after opening it on client. This type of attack can only be prevented by
sufficient protection of client’s computer, e.g. keeping software up to date, enabled virus
and malware protection, etc.
Conclusion. Although Django provides extensive set of tools to improve application’s
security, it is not bulletproof and may also contain critical vulnerabilities. Therefore it is
necessary to stay alert and maintain custom security policies as well.
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Chapter 8
Future Work
This chapter discusses set of additional features that could find their way into application,
and changes or improvements on the implementation side that should be considered before
further project development.
8.1 Additional Features
Multiple extensions that would increase user experience and ease application usage are
possible. Some of most requested ones are described below.
Built in Text Editor and Templates Support. Built-in text editor would certainly
make sense for creating document drafts and would enable user to edit document inside a
window of a web browser, thus saving some time for the user. Similarly, templates could
relieve a user from repetitive task of a new document creation, since documents very often
follow the same or very similar structure.
However, the main disadvantage of these solutions is that built-in editor (embedded
by template system) would necessarily lack a lot of functionality from a fully featured MS
office software and that users often refuse to learn how to utilize another text editor.
Documents Comparison. With growing number of documents that user needs to keep
track of, a lot of time could be saved if it would be possible to view changes from a previous
versions of document inside a web browser, immediately sign or comment them and thus
avoid downloading and comparing them manually1
Drawback of this approach resides in a fact, that existing Office documents would have
to be converted to a markup language before comparing, and no tool can guarantee 100%
formatting similarity of documents before and after conversion.
Document Changes Tracking. Collaboration on a document brings a lot of confusion
about who changed what, and when. This feature would enable a user to select a line or
block of a text, and find originator of every change that has been made to that selection
(similar to git-blame functionality).
As with previous features, support of mark up language would be necessary, to properly
implement this functionality.
1Although, software like MS Office or Libre Office provide ”visual diff“ functionality, necessity of down-loading files still remains.
46
PDF Export. Similarly, support for direct export to PDF format for better portabil-
ity would be of frequent use cases, but we face the same problem here as in the case of
comparison using markup language. Reasonable compromise would be creation of a PDF
document automatically and keep it together with original document and its signatures.
Authentication Based on Biometric ID. Password can be leaked, mobile can be
stolen but biometrics stay with us in any case. Despite this fact, no current technology
for personal use is safe and reliable enough to provide adequate security for a biometric
authentication. Therefore, biometric authentication can be used for additional level of
security together with common authentication techniques in PKI [49].
Integration with Existing Services. Application uses custom authentication system
and certificate management. This enforces user to maintain yet another online ”identity“.Integration with existing tools and services, could make system more appealing for users.
OpenID [41] for example, allows user to use single set of user credentials to access multiple
websites, or YubiKey [61] that allows authentication using one-time password. Allowing
users to use their own certificate, could also be convenient for some of them.
Client as a Browser Extension or Stand-alone application. Despite its growing
popularity, still many concerns exists about security of in-browser JavaScript cryptography
[46, 3]. By providing client application as a signed browser extension, application’s security
would increase, since only verified code would be executed in user’s browser. Another way
how to deliver executable code to client, is by providing stand-alone, installable application,
that would run entirely out of browser. Both approaches would thus require more effort on
client side, possibly discouraging users from application usage.
8.2 Implementation Changes
While proceeding in implementation, some decisions have shown up to be better than
selected ones. In case of the further development, following options should be considered,
in order to achieve better application performance, security and usability.
Storing Versions as a Document Differences. Currently, system stores every version
of a document as a whole file, even if minimal or no change was made since previous
version. In this way, storage requirements on the server can be enormous, if dealing with
multiple versions of ”big“ files. Storing new version as a difference from previous one, couldsignificantly reduce storage usage. On the other side, it would bring notable overhead to the
client, which would have to download first document version and all subsequent differences,
and merge them all to get the current version.
As a reasonable compromise seems to save each new version as a difference from first
one, store each n-th version as a whole file, or store whole file only when major change in
document was made.
Improved Document Storage. Documents are currently stored as a files encoded as
base64 strings in database. This brings overhead on client side – in encoding to, resp.
decoding from base64 – as well as in increased network traffic and required storage on
the server side, since base64 encoded file is approximately 33% bigger than the original
47
one. Moreover, storing big files in database is not recommended, since it can degrade
performance of whole database.
Better solution would be to store files in the filesystem, where relational database would
only hold path to the file. Another, more scalable solution is to use some NoSQL database2.
This approach however, increases complexity of whole system and thus potentially decreases
its security.
Signature Time-stamping by Server. When signing document, current time, accord-
ing to the client computer is attached to the signature. This gives space to the user, to claim
different signing time on the document, than is real signing time. Signature time-stamping
by server would solve this problem, by confirming that user signed specific version of a
document at specific time. Sequential time-stamping (as provided by DocVerify), would
also increase security of whole system.
Extensibility over Plugins. In many cases, only portion of functionality of the system
is required. Allowing administrator to select certain set of features, would provide great
flexibility for custom deployments of application. To ease extensibility of the application,
it would be necessary to redesign it in a way, that only minimal functionality would be
enabled by default(e.g. basic document and user management), and everything else would
require specific plugin. Moreover, by splitting logic of the application into multiple modules,
accessible over strictly specified interface, its development and maintenance would also get
easier.
2NoSQL is type of database, where data have simpler structure than traditional relation tables, allowing
better scalability and flexibility.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Goal of this master thesis was to design cryptographic protocol for secure management and
approval of document versions, and implement this protocol as a client-server application.
As a first step to achieve this goal, it was necessary to explore and review existing
systems with similar functionality, for assessing viability and competitiveness of a new
system. Next step was to gain understanding of security principles required for further de-
velopment, followed by forming application’s requirements and underlying communication
protocol. After that, prototype of system was developed, and application was discussed in
security context according to current standards.
Outcome of this is work is the communication protocol describing sequence and con-
tent of messages exchanged between client and server, database model used for storing
relational data, and client-server application, built above this model and implementing de-
signed communication protocol. Throughout whole development process, emphasis was put
to fundamental aspects of information security, using RMIAS model as a conceptual frame-
work for assessing security threats and developing appropriate countermeasures. Thanks
to utilization of widely used frameworks and libraries, and following security standards and
recommendations, application is well protected against the most common types of attacks
on the internet.
System is implemented as a web application, allowing invited user to register into the
system, upload and download arbitrary version of a document, sign a document, review
document details and collaboration history, or even compare different versions of same
document. End-to-end document encryption and optional two-factor authentication are
also present among features. Each component is implemented using freely available open
source tools and libraries. Since system will be also released under a public license, anyone
will be able to join its development and contribute to the code.
Application is currently not suitable for production deployment, since it lacks some
necessary functionality, e.g. graphical user or permissions management, more user friendly
interface, and also thorough testing. System can be however used as a solid base for further
development and later could certainly find its way into many groups or organizations, where
effective collaboration on documents is necessary.
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CD Content
• technical_report.pdf – technical report as a PDF (this document)
• technical_report.zip – source code of technical report in LATEXformat
• application.zip – source code of application, including README document
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Figure B.1: Document browser.
Figure B.2: Invitation form.
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Figure B.3: Collaboration history example.
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